I relax the full memory assumption in Ely and Välimäki's (2003) mechanic game, where reputation is bad for all players. First I consider bounded memory, where only nitely many recent periods are observed. For long memory, reputation is still bad. Shortening memory avoids bad reputation but only by making it useless. There is no happy middle: reputation is either useless or reduces equilibrium payos for any memory length. I nd a qualitatively dierent result for fading memory, where players randomly sample past periods with probabilities fading toward zero. Unlike bounded memory, reputation is not bad but remains useful under suciently fast fading. This result extends to a more general class of both good and bad reputation games, suggesting reputation leaves long-run player behavior unaected in some realistic word-of-mouth environments.
Introduction
The reputation literature has shown that even very small uncertainty about a player's type can have dramatic effects on equilibrium behavior and payoffs. Building on the seminal work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) , Fudenberg and Levine (1989; 1992) show that in a general class of games, introducing such uncertainty assures the long-run player of a payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff achieved by a credible commitment to an action of her choice. Ely and Välimäki (2003) (henceforth EV) construct a model where reputation has a similarly dramatic but negative effect on payoffs of all players, a phenomenon they call "bad reputation."
These models typically assume that short-run players see the full history of past outcomes.
In reality, agents often perceive reputation through only limited excerpts of the past, raising the question: is it possible to avoid bad reputation by limiting how much of the past is seen? history, the mechanic's anticipation of the critical motorist's decision not to hire must lead to a certain (possibly unnecessary) tune-up even earlier, so this previous motorist also does not hire, and so on by backward induction, leading to a complete unraveling of the market and no hiring on the equilibrium path of all renegotiation-proof Nash equilibria.
However, real mechanics likely do not expect that any particular action is certain to be observed by every subsequent customer. Even if a mechanic knew with certainty that a customer would immediately report her actions to the world in a review on Yelp, she knows that many future potential customers may not see the review, either because they do not check Yelp at all, or because with time, the review is eventually pushed out of sight on the first page. Word-of-mouth seems particularly unlikely to yield fully informed customers due to its decentralized, random nature.
The online review example motivates the bounded memory model, where each motorist sees a finite number of periods into the past, but no further. 1 I find that when memory is long enough, exactly the same equilibrium behavior as the full memory model is obtained because the events in the beginning periods "echo" through the participation decisions of the motorists. If the mechanic signals that she is good with a tune-up, all motorists who see that first tune-up hire her, while the next "generation" of motorists, who do not see that tune-up but see all the hiring that followed, infer her type and also hire even if they see only engine replacements, and so on forever. By contrast, performing only engine replacements early on eventually leads to the mechanic not being hired, and subsequent motorists can infer that the mechanic never performed a tune-up, even in periods they no longer observe, leading to a critical history and thus bad reputation.
Making the memory too short for an individual motorist to learn much about the mechanic allows an equilibrium that avoids the bad reputation result, with the one-shot equilibrium played repeatedly. But reputation is also rendered "useless:" it does not help players because it is too uninformative to have any effect on behavior at all. In this case, customers would not bother paying any cost (such as the time to open a webpage) to view the mechanic's history, as it never provides valuable information that would change their decision -they are just as happy going into the decision "blind." 2 Under bounded memory, is there a way to provide valuable information to motorists without doing more harm than good? I show that the answer is "no." Any equilibrium for any memory length either gives the motorists (as well as the mechanic) an expected payoff lower than that of the one-shot game, or motorists have the same expected payoff and are no better off paying attention to the history than ignoring it. Providing useful information to future customers unavoidably tempts the mechanic into harmful signaling, and so reputation is either bad or useless under bounded memory.
The second type of history observation I consider is "fading memory," where motorists see the last period with probability λ ∈ (0, 1), the second-to-last period with probability λ 2 , and so on for all past periods. This can be thought of as modeling the decentralized randomness of word-ofmouth. Imagine a town where residents leave randomly with some probability each period (and new residents take their place), swapping stories about the mechanic with those who happen to be in town at the time but not with those who have left; a motorist asking around about the mechanic will more likely hear about the most recent experiences, while ancient history is nearly forgotten. 3
Like long bounded memory, fading memory yields the bad reputation result for high λ. Unlike bounded memory, when λ is small enough, reputational incentives are too weak to cause bad reputation, but reputation is still useful. This result seems reasonably realistic: the good mechanic is not diverted from serving customers by extremely strong reputation incentives, good and bad mechanics are both sometimes hired, and some of the more discerning customers avoid the bad type.
Why does fading memory avoid the "bad or useless" result for bounded memory? Bounded memory allows an unbroken chain of observations from the first customer through all subsequent customers: what happens in period 0 is seen in period 1, what happens in period 1 is seen in period 2, and so on. Therefore, what happens in any period t can affect what happens at any future period even after period t is forgotten. When the memory is long enough, this "echo" is exactly what happens, causing bad reputation. By contrast, the gradual, random forgetting of fading memory bounds the probabilities of such observation chains, thereby limiting reputational incentives.
In fact, this result for fading memory with low λ applies to a more general class of reputation games: when the long-run player has a strictly dominant action in the stage game, the long-run player behaves myopically and always chooses that dominant action (as though reputation did not exist), while the payoffs of short-run players are often greater than under the static game because they are sometimes well-informed. This class includes many good reputation games, such as the chain store game of Selten (1978) , variants of which have been widely used to study reputation. 4
The assumption of "low λ" does not mean trivially small: for a patient mechanic, it corresponds to a given motorist talking to an average of 1 2 future potential customers about their experience, high enough to cover scenarios with significant (but not totally ubiquitous) word-of-mouth communication. 5 The result is also robust to any correlation between observations, allowing applications to more centralized communication like online forums where public messages "fade" over time. This suggests reputation may be too weak to affect long-run player behavior in many real word-of-mouth situations.
Though fading memory is intended as a model of word-of-mouth communication, it differs 3 Note that this model means a resident telling one future customer is correlated with the same resident telling another customer. All the fading memory results are robust to such correlation as long as the departures of residents are independent, and the result for low λ is robust to any correlation between observations. 4 See, for example, Pitchik (1993) , Aoyagi (1996) , and Wiseman (2008) . 5 Section B.2 of the Appendix gives a higher upper bound that allows talking to an average of 2 3 future motorists, given some reasonable restrictions on equilibria, which can be even higher depending on the parameterization of the stage game.
importantly from existing work on word-of-mouth (e.g. Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995 and Banerjee and Fudenberg, 2004) where players randomly sample some fixed number of past events. Key differences include that under fading memory, the "sample size" is random, and that players are more likely to observe the recent past than distant past. The fading of past events is critical for ruling out the never-ending echo that occurs in the bounded memory case.
This paper also relates to other (full memory) extensions of the mechanic game. EV show that when the motorist is also a long-run player, an equilibrium exists where the mechanic and motorist are able to interact. Mailath and Samuelson (2006) consider the possibility of random "captive consumers," who hire no matter the history. Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine (2008) extend bad reputation to a broader class of games, illustrating the difference between bad and good reputation. Though this paper only considers bounded and fading memory as applied to the original EV mechanic game, there is no apparent reason why similar results would not apply to such generalizations.
Bounded memory repeated games without reputation have been the topic of a number of papers (for example, see Sabourian, 1998; Mailath and Olszewski, 2011; and Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris, 2013 ) but such games with reputation are relatively unexplored. Liu and Skrzypacz (2014) study a bounded memory product choice game with reputation, finding cyclical behavior, the "riding of reputation bubbles." Liu (2011) also finds cyclical equilibria in an environment where short-run players incur a cost to observe limited records of past long-run player actions. These papers show reputation being continually accumulated, exploited, and then replenished.
A key assumption behind these cyclical results is that only the long-run player's actions are observed, which Liu and Skrzypacz call "limited records." This assumption makes models more tractable, and Liu and Skrzypacz point out that it is realistic in applications like the Better Business Bureau, which does not show how much business a firm gets but does show complaints. Importantly, this gives the long-run player the power to "clean" her history regardless of what the short-run players do, and therefore unilaterally control her reputation.
In many other settings, however, the long-run player needs the cooperation of short-run players to send the signals she wants. For example, a consultant or lawyer needs clients to hire her in order to provide references to future clients; she cannot generate a "high quality" signal through sheer effort alone. Instead, future prospective clients observing that she was not hired may interpret that as a bad signal, leading to persistent unemployment. This lack of total control over one's reputation is critical to the bad reputation effect: the mechanic needs the cooperation of motorists to establish a reputation. While Liu and Skrzypacz find cyclical behavior that is qualitatively different from both the one-shot and full memory cases, this paper instead finds non-cyclical behavior because the reputation gets "stuck." To what extent this applies to other bounded memory reputation games
remains an interesting open question.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines EV's mechanic game and summarizes their result. Section 3 presents the bounded memory model and the corresponding results. Section 4 does the same for fading memory. Section 5 concludes. Omitted proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Mechanic Game
In the mechanic game, reputation leads to a lower payoff for both the long-run and short-run players than in the static game. A long-lived car mechanic faces a different short-lived motorist each period.
Each motorist's car is in one of two states, each requiring a different repair: either a cheap tune-up c or an expensive engine replacement e. The states are drawn iid each with probability 1 2 . The motorist does not know which repair is needed, but the mechanic does.
In each period, the motorist first chooses to either hire the mechanic or choose an outside option N with payoff zero. If hired, the mechanic observes the state of the car, either θ c or θ e . The motorist benefits if the mechanic performs the correct repair, receiving payoffs according to the following table:
Assume w > u > 0. This insures that if the mechanic chooses the repair independent of the state, the motorist will prefer the outside option.
The mechanic can be one of two types: good (g) and bad (b). The mechanic's type is denoted s. The good mechanic has the same stage payoff as the motorist (in the table above), and wants to maximize her expected discounted average payoff, discounted at rate δ ∈ (0, 1). The bad mechanic is non-strategic and simply performs engine replacements, regardless of the state. 6 Motorists observe the full history of repair and hiring decisions, but not the previous motorists' states (i.e., it is not known whether the repairs were correct), as public knowledge. Beginning at period 0, the first motorist has prior belief µ 0 that the mechanic is bad, and subsequent motorists update their beliefs about the mechanic's type according to Bayes' rule.
In the one-shot game, the motorist's expected payoff for hiring is simply 1 2 µ(u − w) + (1 − µ)u where µ is the belief that the mechanic is bad (doing the right repair is strictly dominant for the good mechanic). She will hire the mechanic only if this expected payoff is nonnegative, which is clearly false when the belief µ is greater than critical value p * , where p * is defined so that
EV prove that the supremum of the mechanic's Nash equilibrium payoffs must converge to zero for δ close enough to one, so that equilibria where the mechanic is hired must have the mechanic hired only infrequently. They point out that equilibria with such infrequent hiring have an implausible feature: once the mechanic performs a single tune-up, she reveals herself to be good (with certainty) to all future motorists. After a tune-up, it makes sense that all subsequent motorists (knowing the mechanic is good) will want to hire, and the mechanic will want to perform 6 EV also show their result holds for a strategic bad mechanic who receives u for performing an engine replacement , −w for a tune-up, and 0 when not hired. correct repairs for them. For this reason, EV use the following renegotiation-proofness assumption to rule out such dubious behavior.
Assumption 1. The mechanic is hired at any history on the equilibrium path at which she is known to be good by the motorist.
EV then find the following dramatic result.
Proposition 2.1. Let µ 0 > 0 be given. When δ is close enough to one, any Nash equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1 has a unique equilibrium outcome where the mechanic is never hired.
Without reproducing the proof here, the intuition behind it is that in any equilibrium, if the mechanic performs some number L engine replacements and no tune-ups, the motorists' beliefs must rise above p * and they do not hire. If a motorist hires at any history, the mechanic must perform an engine replacement with sufficient probability (otherwise the motorist's expected payoff from hiring would be negative), and this means that, with positive probability, the mechanic performs L consecutive engine replacements on the equilibrium path. After performing L − 1 engine replacements (and no tune-ups), an engine replacement gives a continuation payoff of 0, compared with a continuation payoff of u for a tune-up (since all future motorists hire). When she is sufficiently patient, the mechanic always performs a tune-up, so she cannot be hired at a "critical" history (i.e., after L − 1 engine replacements without tune-ups); backwards induction leads to the result of no hiring on the equilibrium path.
Bounded Memory
The disaster of Proposition 2.1 is driven by the fact that if the mechanic were ever hired, with positive probability she would arrive at a critical history where providing a needed engine replacement results in her never being hired again. This is because the evidence leading to a belief greater than p * (i.e., the mechanic is too likely to be bad to hire) is never forgotten, and because the mechanic is not hired, she never has another chance to change beliefs, and so a sufficiently patient mechanic cannot resist the temptation to show she is good at such a history.
Can this disastrous outcome be avoided if the damning evidence is eventually forgotten? This section considers the case where memory is bounded: motorists view only the finite T most recent periods.
I make the following two assumptions. First, I follow the example of Rosenthal (1979) and Liu (2011) in assuming that the short-run players (motorists) do not know when the game starts, and have steady-state beliefs induced by the play of the game, meaning they update beliefs according to Bayes' rule as if they have an improper uniform prior over the period at which they enter.
Second, I restrict attention to equilibria which are "purifiable" in the sense of Harsanyi (1973) .
This robustness refinement rules out unrealistically fragile equilibria that may exist in such bounded memory environments, as shown in a number of papers. 7 A purifiable equilibrium is one that 7 See Bhaskar (1998) , Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2008) , and Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2013) for examples.
survives the addition of tiny, independent private shocks to player payoffs. The motivation for this refinement is that, as games are only approximations of reality, some private payoff information always exists, and equilibria that do not survive arbitrarily close approximations of payoffs are therefore unrealistic. Section 3.2 gives the formal definition.
Preliminaries
where h k is the outcome at period k, either a repair (c or e) or a no-hiring decision (N ). Let H ≡ {c, e, N }. The game begins in period 0, and so motorists arriving at period t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1} observe a history h ∈ H t , which is the same as the full history. Motorists arriving in all periods t ≥ T observe a bounded history h ∈ H T , rather than the full history h ∈ H t . Since bounded histories are dealt with more often than full ones, I often refer to bounded histories simply as "histories." The set of all (bounded) histories is H ≡ T k=0 H k , and the set of full histories is H ≡ ∞ k=0 H k . The strategies for the motorists can be represented as a function ρ : H → [0, 1], where ρ(h) gives the probability that a motorist hires at history h. The mechanic's strategy σ ≡ (σ c , σ e ) is given by two functions σ x :H → [0, 1] where x ∈ {c, e} denotes a needed repair (for the hiring motorist) and σ x (h) gives the probability the mechanic performs the needed repair x at full history h. However, Section 3.2 shows that the purifiability requirement implies the mechanic plays a stationary strategy dependent only on the history seen by the motorist, i.e. we can write σ x : H → [0, 1]. I denote the beliefs of motorists about the mechanic with the function µ : H → [0, 1], where µ(h) is the posterior belief that the mechanic is the bad type at history h.
For bounded histories, I use negative subscript −k to indicate the event k periods ago, i.e. h = (h −T , ..., h −2 , h −1 ). It will also be convenient to use notation appending and prepending outcomes onto histories. Let a bounded history h ∈ H T be given. Let hx denote the bounded history consisting of the T − 1 most recent outcomes of h followed by x ∈ H, i.e. hx = (h −(T −1) , ..., h −1 , x).
Let xh denote the bounded history consisting of the x followed by the T − 1 oldest outcomes of h,i.e. xh = (x, h −T , ..., h −2 ). I also use superscripts to denote the repetition of an outcome in a history. For example, e T is the history with all T periods containing an engine replacement, and N e T −1 is the history with an engine replacement T periods ago followed by all engine replacements.
If a motorist at history h hires a mechanic, the expected payoff of hiring must be nonnegative (otherwise the motorist chooses the outside option):
is the probability that the good mechanic performs the correct repair at h. Solving for β(h) gives
, I can substitute (3.1) to get the lower bound
on the probability that a mechanic performs a needed tune-up.
For periods t < T −1 when motorists still observe the full history, the posterior evolves according to Bayes' rule in the same way as the full memory model. Suppose the belief at history h ∈ H t is µ(h). If the motorist does not hire, then µ(hN ) = µ(h); if the mechanic performs a tune-up at h, then µ(hc) = 0; if the mechanic performs an engine replacement, then
so that Υ(µ(h)) is a lower bound for µ(he) (again, assuming h ∈ H t for t < T − 1), and inductively define Υ 1 (µ) ≡ Υ(µ) and Υ k+1 (µ) ≡ Υ(Υ k (µ)), so that Υ k (µ) is a lower bound for the posterior after observing k engine replacements and no tune-ups at t ≤ T − 1. Define
as an upper bound on the number of engine replacements that can be performed (without any tuneups) in the first T periods before the posterior exceeds p * . For T > L(µ 0 ) + 1, it is straightforward to see that the mechanic cannot perform more than L engine replacements without any tune-ups within the first T periods on the equilibrium path. Motorists before period T who arrive after the Lth engine replacement will believe the mechanic is so likely to be bad that the payoff of hiring must be negative, preventing any hiring until at least period T .
Finally, I define terms similar to (3.3) and (3.4) for the case when the mechanic always performs the correct repair, and so performs an engine replacement with probability 1 2 upon being hired. Given prior µ, the motorist's posterior after observing an engine replacement is
Note thatL(µ 0 ) ≤ L(µ 0 ) because L(µ 0 ) is a lower bound that presumes the good mechanic performs engine replacements with maximum probability 1 2 + 1 2 (1 − β * ) > 1 2 .
Purifiability
I follow the example of Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2013) in constructing a sequence of perturbed games, which consist of the mechanic game with the addition of independent private shocks to each action for each player. Let Z be a compact subset of R 2 and write ∆ * (Z) for the set of measures with support Z with strictly positive densities. At each full history h, the motorist draws payoff shocks (z Y r , z N r ) ∈ Z according to distribution ψ r ∈ ∆ * (Z) and the mechanic draws payoff shocks (z c g , z e g ) ∈ Z from a distribution ψ g ∈ ∆ * (Z). Denote ψ ≡ (ψ r , ψ g ). Let ε > 0 be some positive constant. The motorist's payoff to hiring is augmented by z Y r and the payoff to the outside option is augmented by z N r ; the mechanic's payoff to doing a tune-up is augmented by z Y g and the payoff to an engine replacement is augmented by z N g . For example, when hired by a motorist needing an engine replacement, the mechanic receives payoff u + εz e g for performing an engine replacement and payoff −w + εz c g for performing a tune-up. Denote the perturbed game by Γ(ε, ψ). Strategies are mappings from both the public history (observed in the unperturbed game) and the private history of shocks. For the motorist, this consists of a single shock as they are only present for one period, so the strategies of all motorists can be represented as a functioñ ρ : H × Z → {Y, N }. A mechanic strategy at period t in the perturbed game maps from a full history of t outcomes {N, c, e}, a private history of t + 1 private shocks (including the current period's shocks), and t + 1 motorist states, to a repair:
However, note that any outcomes before period t − T , as well as any private shocks and motorist states from all but the current period, are payoff irrelevant. This observation yields the following result, which states that any best response by the mechanic must ignore the private shocks and needed repairs from previous periods for almost all realizations of the current shock. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of Lemma 2 in Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2013) and so is omitted.
Lemma 3.1. For the perturbed game, let motorist strategiesρ be given. For any any k
What this shows that is that in any equilibrium of the perturbed game, the mechanic's strategy is "essentially stationary:" at two periods t, t ≥ T , the mechanic plays identically conditional on having the same public history h ∈ T with probability one. Hence, the probability that the mechanic performs a needed repair x if hired at public history h ∈ H and current shock z ∈ Z iś
Turning back to the unperturbed game, an equilibrium of the perturbed game is weakly purifiable if there exists a sequence of equilibria in a sequence of perturbed games that converge in outcomes to the unperturbed equilibrium (as given in Definition 6 of Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris, 2013) . 8 Definition 3.1. A strategy profile (ρ, σ) of the unperturbed game is weakly purifiable if there exists a sequence (ψ k , ε k ) ∞ k=1 , with ψ ≡ (ψ k r , ψ k g ) ∈ (∆ * (Z)) 2 and lim k→∞ ε k = 0, such that there exists a sequence of strategy profiles
and (ρ k ,σ k ) are part of a sequential equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ(ψ k , ε k ).
Since Lemma 3.1 shows that any equilibrium in the perturbed game is "essentially stationary," purifiability requires that the mechanic play a stationary strategy as a best response to the motorists' stationary strategies.
Results
Can bounding the memory avoid the bad reputation outcome? The first result shows that if memory length is above a threshold (independent of the discount factor), bad reputation persists.
Proposition 3.1. Let µ 0 > 0 and L(µ 0 ) be given. If
then for any weakly purifiable sequential equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1 there is a unique equilibrium outcome where the mechanic is never hired when δ is close enough to one.
Why does bad reputation persist for a patient mechanic despite the fact that the "bad evidence"
is erased? The first part of the proof shows that purifiability requires the mechanic always be hired at the history full of engine replacements (e T ). Purifiability means the mechanic cannot condition her strategy on payoff-irrelevant history (like the outcome T periods ago about to be erased), so the only way a "robust" equilibrium can have motorists hire at ce T −1 but not hire at e T is if they have a sufficiently bad belief at e T . Since not being hired then yields history e T −1 N , the bad belief at e T requires that the bad mechanic eventually returns to history e T sufficiently frequently (otherwise, motorists would have a good belief at e T ). The only way for the bad mechanic to reach e T from e T −1 N is through the history N e T −1 . Yet for long memory, the good mechanic rarely reaches N e T −1 because they are too likely to perform a tune-up in the meantime. Thus, the belief at N e T −1 is so high that motorists do not hire, so the bad mechanic never returns to e T , a contradiction.
The second part of the proof deals with the case where the mechanic is always hired at e T , which means performing a single tune-up ensures the mechanic is hired forever. Thus, a motorist knows whether the mechanic ever performed a tune-up since it will "echo" through the motorists' hiring decisions. If the mechanic is ever hired, she must be hired again soon even if she does an engine replacement (or else the history would be critical). Yet, a motorist who sees a history where the mechanic has L engine replacements, some no-hiring events (N ), and no tune-ups can infer that a tune-up has never occurred in the full history, and so has a belief greater than the critical value p * . Thus, the mechanic is not hired again at least until one of these engine replacements is erased.
When memory is sufficiently long, this means the mechanic is not hired for a long time, and so the mechanic cannot resist the temptation to perform an incorrect tune-up to avoid this fate, yielding the bad reputation outcome.
What if memory is not so long? With a shorter bound on the memory, can we limit how high the motorist beliefs may rise and therefore avoid such a critical history? Indeed we can.
Proposition 3.2. Let µ 0 > 0 and T <L(µ 0 ) be given. A sequential equilibrium exists for any δ where the good mechanic always performs the correct repair and the motorists always hire.
Proof. It is easy to show that always hiring is a best response for motorists. At any period t, the motorists' posterior is less than or equal toῩ T (µ 0 ) ≤ p * , so the payoff of hiring is nonnegative. For the mechanic, the continuation payoff of a tune-up is equal to that of an engine replacement (she is always hired, no matter her strategy), so performing the correct repair always yields a greater payoff.
Proposition 3.2 avoids the disaster of Proposition 3.1, but it does so by preventing reputation from having any effect. Reputation neither tempts the mechanic into a costly tune-up that harms the motorist, nor does it help the motorists sort out a good mechanic from the bad, and the ex ante payoff for every motorist is equal to that of the one-shot game. Reputation is only useful to motorists if it sometimes gives them a posterior greater than p * , so that they can avoid hiring the bad type; the myopic equilibrium avoids bad reputation precisely by ruling out that possibility.
Is there some memory length that avoids the bad reputation result but is also useful in the sense that motorists can achieve expected payoffs greater than those without any memory (i.e. the one-shot game), particularly between the lower bound of Proposition 3.1 and the upper bound of Proposition 3.2? The following result shows that such a "happy medium" is impossible.
Proposition 3.3. Let µ 0 > 0 and T > 0 be given. Letv * (δ) be the supremum of the expected motorist payoff for the set of weakly purifiable sequential equilibria satisfying Assumption 1, and let v 0 be the maximum expected motorist payoff in a sequential equilibrium of the one-shot game. 9 For δ close enough to one,v * (δ) ≤v 0 .
(3.6) Proposition 3.3 shows that equilibria fall into one of the following two categories. Some equilibria yield lower expected payoffs for the motorists than under the one-shot game, as in Proposition 3.1.
Reputation may be useful in the sense that it is individually beneficial to learn from the history, but the memory is doing a disservice to motorists -the market would work better without it. In the other category of equilibria, motorists have the same expected payoffs as under the one-shot game. Thus, the presence of reputation does not harm motorists, but it does not help them either.
If accessing the history was at all costly to the motorists, they would prefer to hire the mechanic blindly. Hence, reputation becomes "useless."
The proof of Proposition 3.3 begins by showing that purifiability requires the mechanic always be hired in a "useful equilibrium" at the history e T (all engine replacements), using a method similar to that used for Proposition 3.1. Since the mechanic is always hired at e T , performing a tune-up ensures the mechanic is hired forever. A good mechanic who is hired always eventually ends up in the set of histories without any no-hire "N " events, and so, roughly speaking, histories containing N s must have bad beliefs (if the mechanic is hired in equilibrium). Thus, the event of not being hired once "echoes," condemning the mechanic to never being hired again. If the equilibrium is useful, the memory must be informative enough that the motorist expects to not hire with positive probability. This implies the existence of a critical history where the mechanic cannot resist the temptation of an incorrect tune-up.
Fading Memory
The results of Section 3 show that bounded memory can only avoid bad reputation at the expense of making reputation "useless" -specifically, bounded memory cannot improve the motorists' expected payoff beyond that of the one-shot game. The information structure introduced in this section, called "fading memory," achieves the happy medium that bounded memory cannot.
Fading memory can be interpreted as roughly reflecting how word-of-mouth spreads. It is not certain that customers hear about previous experiences, nor is it certain that they do not, but it is more likely that they hear about recent history than the distant past. For example, this might model how information is spread in a community (perhaps a town or group of friends) whose members randomly leave and arrive each period. If experiences with the mechanic are shared among the current members, but potential customers do not talk to those who have left, the probability that they hear about an outcome decays exponentially with time.
Fading memory is defined as follows. Motorists observe each previous period with some positive probability. Let p t t denote the probability that the motorist in period t observes the actions in period t < t . By comparison, under full memory this probability is always one; under bounded memory, p t t = 1 for t ∈ {t + 1, ..., t + T } and p t t = 0 for t > t + T . Under fading memory, this probability is never one nor zero, instead starting relatively high right after the event and exponentially "fading" toward zero: p t t = λ t −t for λ ∈ (0, 1). I also allow motorists to observe the calendar date. 10 For the purpose of comparing the expected motorist payoff with the bounded memory case, I assume the motorists have the improper uniform prior before finding out the period in which they arrive. 11 It is assumed that observations are independent across periods-observed, but not necessarily across observers. More formally, let periods t, t , t be given such that t < t < t .
The probability that motorist t observes both periods t and t is assumed to be equal to p t t p t t , but I allow the possibility that the probability that period t is observed by both motorists t and t is not equal to p t t p t t . (The community model described above is consistent with these assumptions so long as the departures of community members are independent.) 12
Low λ yields myopic behavior by the mechanic, thereby avoiding bad reputation. This result extends to a more general class of reputation games, defined in Section 4.1. This class includes many "good reputation" games like Selten's (1978) chain store game (see Section 4.3), as well as other participation and simultaneous-move games. 13
Preliminaries
I define a class of reputation games where the long-run player has a strictly dominant action in the sense defined below. Let an extensive-form game between players 1 (the long-run player) and 2 (the short-run player) be given with finite action spaces A 1 and A 2 , with player 2 moving first and where some subset of actionsÃ 2 ⊂ A 2 lead to a decision node for player 1, moving second. Player 1 may be at any information set about player 2's action within the setÃ 2 . (The special case of a simultaneous-move game is given byÃ 2 = A 2 and player 1's information set includes the entire setÃ 2 .) The long-run player may observe a private signal θ ∈ Θ drawn iid in each period, which may affect both players' payoffs. The payoff for player i of action profile (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ A ≡ A 1 × A 2 is denoted u i (a 1 , a 2 , θ). Since the stage game is extensive-form, strict dominance is needed at decision nodes for the long-run player; I define this notion as "strictly conditionally dominant" (in a simultaneous-move game, this notion is equivalent to a strictly dominant action). 14 Definition 4.1. An action a d ∈ A 1 for player 1 is strictly conditionally dominant if and only if u 1 (a d , a 2 , θ) > u 1 (a 1 , a 2 , θ) for all a 1 ∈ A 1 \{a d }, all a 2 ∈Ã 2 , and all θ ∈ Θ.
I assume such a strictly conditionally dominant action a d ∈ A 1 exists. Define H ≡ (A 2 \Ã 2 ) ∪ (Ã 2 × A 1 ) as the set of terminal nodes in the stage game; the long-run player observes all such outcomes for previous periods. 15 If a short-run player does not observe a period, they see the signal U ("unobserved") in its place. DefineH ≡ H ∪ {U }. Short-run player strategies are given by a function ρ :
Denote the set of short-run player histories asH ≡ ∞ t=0H t . Similarly to Section 3.1, I refer to elementsh ∈H simply as "histories," as opposed to "full histories." To avoid more complicated notation, I assume that the long-run player does not observe the histories observed by shortrun players (i.e., which periods are hidden from them), though the results also hold without this assumption. The long-run player's strategy is a function
I refer to elements of H ≡ ∞ t=0 H t as "full histories." Player 1 is either a rational type ξ 0 , with stage payoffs given by u 1 (a 2 , a 1 , θ) and discount factor δ, or one of N ∈ N commitment types ξ 1 , ..., ξ N , where type j always plays some action α j ∈ ∆A 1 , and short-run players have prior beliefs µ 0 (ξ) on each of these types. Define
z gives the maximum difference in stage payoffs between two action profiles, while z d gives the minimum current period cost of choosing a different action over the strictly conditionally dominant action a d .
Results
I first show that the mechanic plays a (unique) myopic strategy in all equilibria under fading memory when λ is below a threshold. For almost all priors µ 0 ∈ (0, 1], this also implies a unique equilibrium. 16 The type of equilibrium described by Proposition 4.1 is similar to that of Proposition 3.2 in that the mechanic always does the correct repair, but what differs is that the mechanic is not always hired, even when good, because motorists sometimes reach "useful" histories that yield beliefs greater than p * .
15 Proposition 4.1 is straightforward (if notationally cumbersome) to extend to imperfect monitoring, where each terminal node generates a signal drawn from a probability distribution. 16 The mechanic always performs the correct repair in any equilibrium. For almost all priors, there exist no histories where the belief is exactly p * , and so customers play a pure strategy of always hiring at histories where the belief is less than p * and never hiring at histories with a belief greater than p * . (At the Lebesgue measure zero set of priors where equilibria do have histories with exactly belief p * , any mixed actions at such histories could be part of an equilibrium.) This result is given for a more general set of games defined in Section 4.1, namely those where the long-run player has a strictly dominant action in the stage game. It is also stronger than Proposition 3.2 because it shows that every equilibrium has myopic behavior by the long-run player.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the game defined in Section 4.1, where the rational player 1 has action
where z and z d are defined as in (4.1) and (4.2), then any sequential equilibrium has rational player 1 playing a d at every history.
One striking feature is that the upper bound on λ does not depend on δ or the prior beliefs. This is because the proof does not rely on calculating beliefs. The action at some period t affects the payoff at some later period t > t only if either t observes t directly or there exists some sequence (t 1 , ..., t n ) such that motorist t 1 observes t, motorist t j observes t j−1 for all j ∈ {2, ..., n}, and motorist t observes t n . The proof bounds the probability of such "observation chains." Of course, the motorists in these chains would also have to change their action in response to their observation to affect the payoff at t (so the bound is not as high as it could be), but ignoring the actual beliefs allows using essentially the same technique for fading memory in other games. This is impossible in the bounded memory environment because such a chain always connects every period together even for the shortest memory case T = 1: period 1 observes period 0, period 2 observes period 1, and so on. In the case of the mechanic game, z = z d = u + w, so the upper bound (4.3) on λ is 1/(3δ); for λ = 1 3 this corresponds to a customer sharing her experience with an average of 1 3 + 1 3 2 + · · · = 1 2 future customers. 17 The following example illustrates why the upper bound on λ is sufficient for precluding the "echo" that occurs under bounded memory.
Example 4.1. Let λ = 1 3 . If the motorist hires at period 0, the difference in stage payoffs between doing the right repair and the wrong repair is u + w. The probability that motorist 1 observes the repair at period 0 is 1 3 . The probability that motorist 2 observes period 1 is 1 9 , and the probability that motorist 2 observes period 1 and period 1 observes period 0 is 1 9 , so the probability of a "chain" of observations between period 0 and period 2 is bounded by 2 9 . The probability that period 3 observes period 0 is 1 27 , the probability that 3 observes 1 and 1 observes 0 is 1 9 · 1 3 = 1 27 , and the probability that 3 observes 2 and that period 0 "reaches" period 2 via an observation chain is less than or equal to 1 3 · 2 9 = 2 27 , so the probability that such a chain exists between period 0 and period 3 is bounded by 4 27 . This pattern continues so that the probability of a chain from period 0 to period t is bounded from above by 2 t−1 /3 t . The maximum difference the period 0 repair can make in the stage payoff at any future period that has a chain of observations back to period 0 is u + w, 18 so the discounted sum over these differences is ∞
, which is less than the period 0 benefit of doing the right repair (u + w). Thus, doing the right repair is the only best response.
Because motorists sometimes receive information that is useful for avoiding the bad mechanic, the ex ante payoff for all but the first few motorists is strictly greater in this equilibrium than in the one-shot game. Furthermore, for comparison with the "bad or useless reputation" result of Proposition 3.3, the motorist's payoff is also greater than the one-shot payoff in expectation over the improper uniform prior on the calendar date.
Corollary 4.1. Let λ > 0 satisfying (4.3) be given. Letv 0 be the maximum expected motorist payoff in a sequential equilibrium of the one-shot game. There is a unique sequential equilibrium expected payoff v * t (δ) for the motorist arriving in period t. Let the motorist expected payoff (taken over the improper uniform prior over the periods) be v * (δ). For all δ, v * t (δ) =v 0 for t <L and v * t (δ) >v 0 for t ≥L. Furthermore, v * (δ) >v 0 .
When history "fades" too slowly (i.e. λ is high), the bad reputation outcome returns. I first present a result that is weaker than Proposition 3.1 because it uses a different order of taking limits: instead of holding λ fixed and letting δ → 1, it holds δ fixed and lets λ → 1. I then give a stronger result with the same order of limits as Proposition 3.1, using a mild restriction on equilibria.
Proposition 4.2. Let µ 0 > 0 and δ > (u + w)/(2u + w) be given. Then for λ close enough to one, for any sequential equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1 there is a unique equilibrium outcome where the mechanic is never hired.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 shows that as λ gets arbitrarily close to one, the mechanic who performs a tune-up at a critical history is hired with probability close to one for arbitrarily many periods, while doing an engine replacement yields arbitrarily many periods of not being hired. At some point, the "memory" of the repair will (at least directly) fade away, and this "premium" the mechanic receives for a tune-up will eventually go away (or at least the bounds used cannot rule that out). The proof does not rule out the possibility that this premium for the tune-up is eventually (at periods far in the future) replaced by an even greater premium for the engine replacement. Instead, it simply relies on λ being high enough that any such "reverse premium" is postponed long enough that it is discounted away.
Establishing a lower bound on λ independent of the discount factor clearly requires ruling out such a reverse premium, which seems intuitively implausible because it requires that motorists far into the future are somehow dissuaded from hiring because of a tune-up, rather than an engine replacement, that they never observe directly (if they observed it directly they would hire, of course, because of Assumption 1). By restricting attention to equilibria where tune-ups do not, in expectation, dissuade future motorists from hiring, a lower bound on λ independent of δ is obtained that gives the bad reputation result.
Criterion 1. Let a sequential equilibrium with strategy profile (ρ, σ) be given. Letσ h denote the strategy identical to σ except that the mechanic does a tune-up with certainty at full history h ∈ H t .
The equilibrium satisfies Criterion 1 if and only if doing a tune-up at h for h ∈ H t does not decrease the probability of being hired at any future period k given the motorists' strategies and beliefs, i.e.
Criterion 1 is similar in spirit to the D1 Criterion (see, for example, Section 11.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)), but it is about actions instead of beliefs. (The proof of Proposition 4.1 shows that any equilibrium satisfying its assumptions must also satisfy Criterion 1.) The following result shows that the bad reputation result occurs when holding λ fixed and letting δ → 1.
Proposition 4.3. Let µ 0 > 0 and L(µ 0 ) be given. There exists λ * such that for any λ ∈ (λ * , 1), for all sequential equilibria satisfying Assumption 1 and Criterion 1, there is a unique equilibrium outcome where the mechanic is never hired for δ close enough to one.
The Chain Store Game
Among the class of games that Proposition 4.1 applies to is the infinitely repeated version of the chain store game, depicted in Figure 4 .1, where the competitor is the short-run player and the incumbent is the long-run player. Let µ 0 be the prior belief that the incumbent is a "tough" commitment type that plays F every time entry occurs and probability 1 − µ 0 that the incumbent is a normal or "weak" (rational) type. The chain store game is a typical example of a game where reputation is good for the long-run player: Fudenberg and Levine (1989) show that under full memory, there is a lower bound on long-run player payoffs that approaches the Stackelberg payoff (which in this game is c) as δ approaches one. As with the mechanic game, reputation increases the ex ante payoffs of the short-run players above that of the one-shot game. The increase here is more dramatic than in the mechanic game because a competitor need only observe one previous period to know if the incumbent is tough (all periods will be either F or Out) or weak (all periods are A). Thus, the ex ante payoff of competitor t is
is the probability of competitor t observing no history at all, which is strictly greater than the one-shot payoff for all competitors except at period 0. 19 This is straightforward to calculate and plotted in Figure 4 .2 for some example parameters.
Correlation
Though this section generally assumes observations are independent across periods-observed, Proposition 4.1 (along with Corollary B.1) is robust to correlation between observations. This is because the proofs rely on Boole's inequality to bound the probability of the current repair being "chained" to any particular future period and then use the expected discounted sum of the effects of these chains at each future period for a bound on the continuation value. So long as the probabilities of these observations satisfy the "fading" definition, this correlation does not affect Proposition 4.1.
Correlation between observations can be interpreted as certain consumers being more connected to each other than others (a network of friends may be more likely to offer advice to each other than to strangers), and it does not have to be interpreted as decentralized communication. For example, consider messages posted on a centralized medium like an online forum, where it is visible to future customers while on the front page but with probability λ it disappears from view because other unrelated messages have pushed it off the front page. Others may publish replies underneath the post, sharing their own experiences; when the original post is pushed out of view, so are all 19 ψ(λ, t) converges absolutely as t → ∞ to a value in the set (0, 1) when λ ∈ (0, 1) (Apostol, 1976) . these replies. In this case, if consumer t's post disappears at the end of period t > t, then all consumers t + 1, ..., t will see his message, but none of the consumers after period t do. The ex ante probability that period t is observed by period t+k is still λ k , which is sufficient for the bounds used by Proposition 4.1 to ensure myopic long-run player behavior.
Conclusion
For the mechanic game with bounded memory, reputation is bad when short-run players have a long enough memory T . This is because early events that tarnish the mechanic's reputation "echo" for all following periods through the refusal of subsequent motorists to hire, which is observed by the following motorists who consequently also refuse to hire, and so on. When T is small enough, an equilibrium exists where the good mechanic always plays myopically. This equilibrium avoids bad reputation at the expense of making reputation irrelevant -motorists never see enough information to change their hiring decisions. It is impossible to shorten memory in a way that still provides valuable information to motorists but does not lower equilibrium payoffs, because the mechanic is too tempted to perform incorrect repairs: reputation is either bad or useless.
Under fading memory, when λ is less than a critical value, an equilibrium with myopic behavior by the mechanic exists, but reputation is still useful -sometimes motorists are informed enough that they do not hire. This increases the motorists' expected payoffs. The result holds more generally for reputation games where the long-run player has a strictly dominant action in the stage game: when λ is less than a critical value, the long-run player's equilibrium strategy is always to play the dominant action. This is because fading memory bounds the probability of an "observation chain" from the current period t to future periodt, where t > t observes t, t > t observes t , etc., which bounds the reputational payoffs of any signaling strategy. By contrast, such a chain always exists in bounded memory, even when T = 1, because period 1 always observes 0, period 2 always observes 1, etc. For high λ, the bad reputation result is recovered. The result for fading memory with small λ applies directly to the chain store game, for example, leading to a more dramatic increase in short-run player payoffs because they need only observe one past period to learn the long-run player's type.
While the above argument for fading memory carries over directly to the chain store game, the bounded memory arguments do not. For example, even for T = 1, there does not exist a "myopic" equilibrium in the chain store game. An interesting question is whether bounded memory equilibria in Stackelberg-type games like the chain store game can exhibit the cyclical behavior under limited records found by Liu and Skrzypacz (2014) or have the non-cyclical behavior of the mechanic game.
More generally, behavior in other bounded memory reputation games remains largely unknown and is an interesting topic for future research.
A Proofs of Bounded Memory Results

A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Suppose by contradiction that for any δ * ∈ (0, 1), there always exists δ ∈ (δ * , 1) such that a sequential equilibrium with strategies (ρ, σ) exists with positive probability of hiring on the equilibrium path.
I begin by introducing some useful notation in addition to that defined in Section 3.1. Define
is the probability that type ξ ∈ {b, g} does an engine replacement upon being hired at history h. Define φ t ξ (h) as the probability of type ξ reaching history h at period t. Define Qt ξ (h) ≡ t t=0 φ t ξ (h), and define
R ξ (h) is the long-run average probability that type ξ is at history h. Note that R ξ (h) > 0 only if Q ∞ ξ (h) = ∞. By Bayes' rule, the belief at history h is given by
,
Let C be the set of histories with c in them, and let
The following lemma uses the fact that purifiability restricts players to playing the same strategy at histories where the decision problem is the same.
Lemma A.1. Let a weakly purifiable sequential equilibrium with strategy profile (ρ, σ) be given. It
Proof. The argument follows the logic of Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2013) . Since (ρ, σ) is weakly purifiable, there exists a sequence (ψk, εk) ∞ k=1 with ψk ≡ (ψk b , ψk g ) ∈ (∆ * (Z)) 2 and limk →∞ εk = 0, such that there exists a sequence of strategy profiles (ρk,σk) ∞ k=1 such that (ρk,σk) is a sequential equilibrium in the Γ(ψk, εk) perturbed game and 
and so by (A.1), σ x (e T ) = σ x (ce T −1 ) = σ x (N e T −1 ).
The following lemmas characterize the case where ρ(e T ) < 1. Proof. Suppose not, so then µ * < µ(N e T −1 ) or µ(e T ) < µ(N e T −1 ). The former case clearly implies ρ(N e T −1 ) = 0, and in the latter case, Lemma A.1 implies that ρ(N e T −1 ) = 0. Thus, upon reaching a history in X + , the bad mechanic never returns to a history outside X + . Note also that there are never more than L engine replacements performed in the first T periods, so the bad mechanic always arrives in period T at a history in X + . Thus, Q t b (e T ) = 0 for all t. If the good mechanic is hired at any history with positive probability in equilibrium, she must perform a tune-up with positive probability. Since Assumption 1 requires she be hired immediately following a tune-up, and she must perform a tune-up with positive probability following each hiring, she must reach ce T −1 with positive probability and be hired. Thus, the good mechanic reaches e T with positive probability in equilibrium, and so lim t→∞ Q t g (e T ) > 0 which gives µ(e T ) = 0. Lemma A.1 then requires that ρ(e T ) = 1, a contradiction. Let any hN ∈ X + be given. If ζ(hN ) ≤ζ for someζ ∈ (0, 1), then it must be that ζ(N h) ≤ζ or ζ(eh) ≤ζ. Suppose by contradiction that ζ(N h) >ζ and ζ(eh) >ζ. Then
=ζ.
A similar argument shows that for any he ∈ X + , ζ(he) ≤ζ implies that ζ(N h) <ζ or ζ(eh) <ζ switches to a history hx / ∈ B + in the next period, and defineτ ξ (h) as the probability that type ξ at history h ∈ B switches to N e T −1 in the following period. Define ω ξ (h) as the probability that type ξ at history h / ∈ B switches to a history hx ∈ B in the next period. We can then write
and summing over t and taking the limit gives
Rearranging shows that long-run average probability of leaving B must be equal to the long-run average probability of entering B:
, respectively, is that the good mechanic also has the additional possibility of leaving B by playing c. Since B is defined such that for all h ∈ B,
.
However, note that for any h / ∈ B, if ω ξ (h) > 0, then h ∈ X + \B, since all histories in X + ⊃ B are only reachable within one period from other histories in X + except for e T −1 N , and by definition of
This implies that the right hand side of (A.2) is greater than or equal to ζ(e T −1 N ), a contradiction.
Finally, suppose that 
For all h ∈ D and t > T ,
whereτ h,m ξ (h) is the probability that type ξ at historyh reaches h in exactly m periods without reaching e T −1 N in the intermediate periods . Summing over t starting from t = T + 1 gives
Note that the first term on the right hand side is equal to the total probability that type ξ at e T −1 N ever reaches h, multiplied by the sum over φ l ξ (e T −1 N ) for all periods l, i.e.
h,m ξ (h) denote the probability that type ξ ath ever reaches h without passing through e T −1 N . We can then rewrite (A.5) as
for any histories h , h ∈ X + because the good type can only be more likely to reach h by doing a tune-up at some point, and then the only way to get back to histories within X + (and therefore to h ) is by passing through e T −1 N (which is excluded by the definition ofP h ξ (·)). Also note that φ T b (h) ≥ φ T g (h) for allh ∈ X + since the good mechanic can only reach h at period T by always performing engine replacements up to that point. Thus, we can see that
For any history h ∈ T , in order to arrive at history N e T −1 in T − 1 periods requires performing T − 1 consecutive engine replacements, and since the the good type must perform c with at least probability 1 2 β * when hired, it must be that (
Above it was shown that for all h ∈ D, ζ(h) ≥ min 1, ζ(e T −1 N ) . Note that ζ(N ) = 1. Therefore
If 1 ≥ ζ(e T −1 N ), then the lemma is proven. If 1 < ζ(e T −1 N ), then ζ(N e T −1 ) ≥ (1 − 1 2 β * ) −(T −1) . The definitions of Υ(·) and ζ * give
The following lemma shows that the conclusions of the lemmas above lead to a contradiction when the mechanic is sufficiently patient.
Lemma A.4. Let T > L be given. For δ close enough to one, there does not exist a weakly purifiable sequential equilibrium (ρ, σ) such that the mechanic is hired in equilibrium, ρ(e T ) < 1,
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that such an equilibrium does exist. Note that φ t+1 ξ (e T −1 N ) = (1 − ρ(e T ))φ t ξ (e T ) + (1 − ρ(N e T −1 ))φ t ξ (N e T −1 ), so averaging over t and taking the limit t → ∞ gives
Since we have supposed that ζ(e T ) ≥ ζ(N e T −1 ) > ζ(e T −1 N ), we have a contradiction because this implies that the right hand side of (A.6) is strictly greater than the left.
For the rest of the proof, suppose that ρ(e T ) = 1. Letk ≡ u+w u , and let T > (L + 1)k be given. Then, C + is a closed class, and so a motorist arriving at a history h / ∈ C + knows that a c has not appeared before in the full history.
Lemma A.5. Suppose that ρ(e T ) = 1. For δ close enough to one, if the mechanic is hired, there existsρ > 0 such that the mechanic is hired withink periods with probability greater than or equal toρ.
Proof. If the mechanic is hired at history h in period t and performs c, then rehiring occurs the next period by Assumption 1, and because ρ(e T ) = 1, the mechanic is hired forever after as well, yielding a continuation payoff of u. Because the mechanic must weakly prefer the correct repair, incentive compatibility when an engine replacement is needed requires (1 − δ)u + δV (he) ≥ −(1 − δ)w + δu.
Suppose by contradiction that the mechanic is hired with probability zero for k >k periods. Then V (he) ≤ δ k u, so incentive compatibility gives
By l'Hôpital's rule, the limit of the right hand side as δ → 1 is k > u+w u , so for δ close enough to one, there is a contradiction. I show that if the mechanic is hired on the equilibrium path at any history, there exists some K ≤ L and some history h 0 ∈ H T reached on the equilibrium path, without any tune-ups, and containing K engine replacements all within thekK most recent periods.
If the mechanic is not hired in equilibrium in the first T periods, then the mechanic is necessarily hired with positive probability at h 0 = N T . Suppose instead that the mechanic is hired in equilibrium within the first T periods. Let t 0 < T be the earliest period at which the mechanic is hired with positive probability in some weakly purifiable sequential equilibrium. Lemma A.5 implies that there must be a history where the mechanic is hired with positive probability within k periods of t 0 , and performs an engine replacement. Furthermore, there can be at most L engine replacements in the first T periods. Thus, there exists a history h 0 ∈ H T , reached in equilibrium at period T , where the mechanic is hired some K ≤ L times and performs an engine replacement, and all of those engine replacements happen at or after period T − Kk and before period T .
Having established the existence of h 0 , suppose that the mechanic is hired at h 0 at some period t ≥ T . Lemma A.5 also implies that the mechanic must be hired and perform an engine replacement with positive probability at or before period t +k, t + 2k and so on. Thus, for δ close enough to one, the mechanic must be hired with positive probability in equilibrium at some sequence of histories
.. are all non-negative integers less than or equal tok. Thus, in equilibrium with positive probability, the mechanic is hired L times, beginning at some period t 0 ≥ T − Kk and before period T + (L − K)k. Since there are L engine replacements in the (bounded) history and at least one N occurrence, the motorist knows a tune-up has not occurred in the full history, and so µ(h L−K ) > p * . Since T > (L + 1)k, all of the historiesh L−K N,h L−K N 2 , ...,h L−K Nk +1 still contain L engine replacements (none of the engine replacements have yet been "erased") and so have beliefs greater than p * . Yet Lemma A.5 implies that the mechanic is hired with positive probability at at least one of these histories, so there is a contradiction.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3
First, if µ 0 > p * , the result is trivial because the mechanic is never hired, both in the one-shot and repeated games, because the prior is too high to hire even if the mechanic does the correct repair with certainty, sov * (δ) =v 0 = 0 for all δ. The rest of the proof considers the case µ 0 ∈ (0, p * ], and sov 0 = µ 0 u−w 2 + (1 − µ 0 )u. I reuse the notation from the proof of Proposition 3.1. The following lemma shows that a "useful reputation" equilibrium requires a "useful history"
where the belief exceeds µ * and occurs with positive long-term probability. 
. For any h such that R(h) > 0, Bayes' rule gives
Suppose that v * >v 0 . Sincev 0 = µ 0 u−w 2 + (1 − µ 0 )u for µ 0 ∈ (0, p * ], a necessary condition is that there exist h such that R(h) > 0, ρ(h) < 1, and 0 > µ(h) u−w 2 + (1 − µ(h))u, which implies µ(h) > p * .
Suppose that ρ(e T ) < 1. To rule this case out, I adapt analogous lemmas from the proof of Proof. Suppose not, so then µ(e T ) < µ(N e T −1 ). Lemma A.1 implies that ρ(N e T −1 ) = 0. Then φ t+1
ξ (e T ) = ρ(ce T )s ξ (ce T )φ t ξ (ce T −1 )+ρ(e T )s ξ (e T )φ t ξ (e T ) and summing over t and taking the limiting average gives
Note that upon reaching a history in X + , the bad mechanic never returns to a state outside X + (because ρ(N e T −1 ) = 0). Since ρ(e T ) < 1, for the bad mechanic e T is a transient state for the bad type, so R b (e T ) = 0. If R g (e T ) > 0, then ρ(e T ) = 1 by Assumption 1, a contradiction. If R g (e T ) = 0, then it must be that R g (ce T −1 ) = 0, which similarly requires R g (ece T −2 ) = R g (cce T −2 ) = R g (N ce T −2 ). A backward induction argument shows that R g (C) = 0 for the set C of all histories containing c, which implies v * = 0 <v 0 since motorists expect a tune-up with probability zero, a contradiction.
Lemma A.8. Suppose that ρ(e T ) < 1. Then ζ(N e T −1 ) > ζ(e T −1 N ) in any weakly purifiable sequential equilibrium violating (3.6).
Proof. The proof of Lemma A.3 does not rely on the assumption that T > L until (A.3), so we need only rule out the case where For the remainder of the proof, suppose that ρ(e T ) = 1. Then C + is an closed class set of states (once the mechanic enters C + , she never leaves).
Suppose that ρ(N T ) > 0. Note that conditional on being at a history in X + , the mechanic is hired with some minimum probability q > 0 within somek ≤ T + 1 periods, either because she is hired at some history h = N T with positive probability or because she is not hired for T periods, thereby reaching history N T and then being hired with positive probability ρ(N T ) > 0.
Since the good mechanic performs c with at least probability 1 2 β * upon being hired, φ t+k g (X + ) ≤ (1− 1 2 β * ρ )φ t g (X + ) for all t ≥ T . This implies that R g (X + ) = 0. Suppose there exist a history h ∈ X such that R b (h) > 0. This means that µ(h) = 1, and so R b (hN ) ≥ R b (h). By induction, this means that R b (N T ) > 0, and so µ(N T ) = 1. But then a motorist at N T will not hire, a contradiction of
Finally, suppose that ρ(N T ) = 0, so N T is an absorbing state. If the good mechanic is at a history in X , she will be at a history not in X within T periods (and never return) with some minimum probability q > 0, because either she is not hired for T periods and reaches N T (an absorbing state) or she is hired at some history h ∈ X , and performs a tune-up with at least probability 1 2 β * . Thus, φ t+T g (X ) ≤ (1 − q)φ t g (X ), and a similar argument to that in the previous paragraph shows that R g (X ) = R b (X ) = 0.
Thus, Lemma A.6 shows that an equilibrium violating (3.6) requires µ(N T ) > p * . Note that
We can see that
I now show that for δ close enough to one, either
is the (T − 1)-length history of the T − 1 oldest outcomes in h. Then
and so µ(h T −1 ) > p * . By induction, this argument shows that µ(h T −k ) > p * for all k ∈ {1, ..., k}.
This implies that ρ(h t−k ) = 0 for all k ∈ {1, ..., k}, and since V (h) = 0, we have V (h T −k ) = 0.
Since φ T −k b (h T −k ) > 0, the mechanic is hired at h T −(k+1) on the equilibrium path, and so the mechanic must perform a needed engine replacement; incentive compatibility requires
which is a contradiction for δ close enough to one. Thus, φ T b (h)/φ T g (h) ≤ ζ * , and so (A.10) is proven.
By induction, there exists some history h, such that the most recent outcome is e, µ(hN l ) > µ * for all l ≥ 0 and Q ∞ b (h) > 0. Hence, the mechanic is hired at xh for some x ∈ {N, e, c} on the equilibrium path, and so the good mechanic must weakly prefer performing a needed engine replacement at xh. Since V (h) = 0 and the continuation payoff to playing c is u (since the mechanic is hired forever after), incentive compatibility at xh requires (1 − δ)u + δ · 0 ≥ −(1 − δ)w + δu, which clearly gives a contradiction for δ close enough to one.
B Proofs of Fading Memory Results
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Let any sequential equilibrium with strategies (ρ, σ), and a full history h at period t be given.
Suppose player 1 faces a decision node, i.e. she is at some information set over player 2's action a 2 ∈Ã 2 and observes private signal θ ∈ Θ. Let V (h(a 2 , a 1 )) denote player 1's continuation payoff following the action profile (a 2 , a 1 ). 20 Player 1 plays a d with certainty if
is the expectation over player 2's actions a 2 ∈Ã 2 given player 1's information set (in the mechanic game, of course, player 1 knows a 2 (hiring) becauseÃ 2 is a singleton). (B.1) can be rearranged as
The left hand side of (B.2) is equal to the discounted sum of the expected differences in stage payoffs at every future period. Denoting player 1's stage payoff at some periodt > t as ν(t), let ν a 2 ,a 1 (h,t) ≡ E[ν(t)|h(a 2 , a 1 )] be the expected stage payoff att conditional on reaching full history h(a 2 , a 1 ). An upper bound on the change in the expected stage payoff att due to choosing an action different from a d at full history h is ∆ν(h,t) ≡ max (a 2 ,a 1 )∈Ã 2 ×A 1 {ν a 2 ,a 1 (h,t) −ν a 2 ,a d (h,t)} ≤ z. The action at t can only affect player 1's payoff att if periodt observes t directly, or observes some period t ∈ {t+1, ...,t−1} that observes t, etc.; otherwise, player 2's action at periodt is necessarily independent of the events of period t. This notion of an "observation chain" is formalized as "t reachest" in the following definition.
Definition B.1. Let two periods t and t > t be given. Inductively define the relation "t kreaches t " as follows. If period t observes period t , then t is said to 0-reach t . If period t observes some periodt ∈ {t + 1, ..., t − 1} andt k-reaches t , then t is said to (k + 1)-reach t .
More simply, if (and only if) period t k-reaches t for some k ∈ {0, 1, ...}, then t is said to reach t .
Let φ(t,t) denote the probability that t reachest, which gives the upper bound ∆ν(h t ,t) ≤ φ(t,t)z. The following lemma gives an upper bound for φ(t,t).
Lemma B.1. For any two periods t andt > t, φ(t,t) ≤ 2t −t−1 λt −t .
Proof. The proof is by induction. Fort = t + 1, φ(t,t) = λ is trivially true. Now suppose that for
The probability that t reachest + 1 is the probability that short-run playert + 1 observes either t or some period t ∈ {t + 1, ...,t − 1} such that t reaches t . Then Boole's inequality gives
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"h(a2, a1)" denotes the full history consisting of (a2, a1) appended to h.
I can now write an upper bound for the left hand side of (B.2):
Since δλ < 1 2 ,
The right hand side of (B.3) is a strictly increasing function of λ for λ ∈ (0, 1/(2δ)). Substituting
for any a 1 ∈ A 1 , a 2 ∈Ã 2 , so (B.1) is true.
B.2 A Higher Upper Bound for λ for Myopic Equilibria in the Mechanic Game
Proposition 4.1 assumes that the "worst case" when an "observation chain" reaches a future period is the stage payoff decreasing by the maximum feasible amount z; in the mechanic game, this difference is u + w. A tighter bound that seems natural is the difference between the highest feasible payoff and the minmax payoff (u). The following corollary uses that bound on the stage payoff difference to give a higher upper bound on λ, using Assumption 1 and Criterion 1. For δ close to one, as w/u approaches 1 the bound (B.4) approaches 2 5 (corresponding to motorists talking to an average of 2 3 future motorists) and as w/u approaches ∞, (B.4) approaches 1 2 (corresponding to an average of 1 future motorist). Then the action outcome of any sequential equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1 and Criterion 1 has the good mechanic doing the correct repair when hired.
Proof. Let σ denote the equilibrium strategy of the good mechanic, and letσ be the strategy identical to σ except that at any full history containing a tune-up, the mechanic does the right repair with certainty (it may be that σ =σ). The following result allows a simplification of the continuation payoffs for a tune-up.
Lemma B.2. Let a sequential equilibrium under fading memory given λ satisfying Assumption 1 and Criterion 1 be given. At any full history h ∈ H on the equilibrium path containing a tune-up, it is a best response for the mechanic to perform the correct repair.
Proof. Any motorist observing the full history (which occurs with positive probability at every full history) must hire due to Assumption 1. This is only possible if the mechanic performs the correct repair with at least positive probability β * no matter the car's state, so it must be a best response.
Thus, deviating toσ must be a best response at any full history containing a tune-up. Calculation of the expected stage payoffs following a tune-up (simply the probability of being hired times u) is simpler forσ and allows them to be used as upper bounds on the expected stage payoffs following an engine replacement because of Criterion 1.
For the remainder of the proof, suppose that the mechanic deviates toσ, which has the same continuation payoffs as σ at every full history, an implication of Lemma B.2. Let the notation and arguments in the proof of Proposition 4.1 (Appendix B.1) up to and including Lemma B.1 be given, except that all notation is with respect to the strategyσ (not σ) and a 2 is omitted from subscripts (because in the mechanic game, at a mechanic's decision node, a 2 is known to be "hire"). At any full history h, let πt a (h) be the probability that the mechanic is hired at periodt > t conditional on repair a at h.
Criterion 1 implies that the continuation payoff for a tune-up is greater than or equal to that of an engine replacement becauseν c (h,t) = πt c (h)u ≥ πt e (h)u ≥ν e (h,t). Therefore, when the motorist at h t needs a tune-up, performing a tune-up strictly dominates an engine replacement.
What remains to be shown is that performing a needed engine replacement strictly dominates doing an incorrect tune-up. Letσ be the strategy identical toσ, except that any full history following he (i.e. any full history that begins with h followed by e at period t) the mechanic always does the right repair. LetV ,πt a ,ν a be the analogues of V, πt a ,ν a (which are defined forσ) for a deviation toσ. Note thatν e (h,t) =πt e (h)u,πt c (h) = πt c (h),V (hc) = V (hc), andV (he) ≤ V (he).
Then substituting (B.4) into λ gives
Therefore, doing an incorrect tune-up is not a best response.
B.3 Proof of Corollary 4.1
The mechanic has a unique equilibrium strategy, and the only case where the motorists do not have a unique equilibrium strategy is if they are indifferent; hence the equilibrium payoffs are unique.
Motorist t observing historyh ∈H t for some t does not hire if µ(h) > p * . Note that by definition of L, for periods t <L, there are no histories yielding a belief greater than p * , and so hiring is always a best response, yielding the one-shot equilibrium payoff for the motorist. The expected payoff of a motorist conditional on period t and the mechanic's type s is
where ρ(h) is the probability of hiring givenh. Thus, the expected motorist t payoff is
where P ρ,σ (h|s) is the probability that historyh occurs at period t conditional on type s given ρ, σ.
Bayes' rule gives
where P ρ,σ (h) is the probability ofh at t (unconditional on the mechanic's type). Substituting the right hand side expressions into (B.5) gives
The term in brackets is the expected payoff of hiring ath, which is negative when µ(h) > p * since the mechanic always does the right repair and therefore ρ(h) = 0. If there exists anyh such that P ρ,σ (h) > 0 and µ(h) > p * , then I can write
where 1{·} is an indicator function (set to one if the statement is true and zero otherwise). The right hand side of (B.6) is the one-shot ex ante payoff. It is easy to see for every period t >L(µ 0 ) that such a historyh exists (at a minimum, they observe the full history with only engine replacements with positive probability). Let some t ≥L(µ 0 ) be given. Note that the unconditional probability that the outcome is e or N in any period k is greater than 1 2 . Let q k t be the probability that motorist t observes exactly k periods. Let ψ(r, m) ≡ m l=1 (1−r k ). The probability of observing the k most recent periods and none of the older ones is λ k(k+1) ψ(λ k , t− k). The (unconditional) probability that the outcomes in periods t − k − 1, ..., t − 1 are all either e or N is greater than 2 −k . The probability that motorist t observes a historyh with µ(h, t) > p * with k periods of either e or N is greater than 2 −k λ k(k+1) ψ(λ k , t − k). Since ψ(λ, t) converges absolutely as t → ∞ to some value χ ∈ (0, 1) (Apostol, 1976) , the probability that any motorist t ≥L observes a historyh such that µ(h, t) > p * is bounded from below by 2 −L λL (L+1) χ. Thus, there exists ε > 0 such that v * t >v 0 + ε for all t ≥L(µ 0 ), and so v * = limt →∞ 1 t+1 t t=0 v * t >v 0 .
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Suppose by contradiction that for any λ * ∈ (0, 1), there always exists λ ∈ (λ * , 1) such that a sequential equilibrium exists with positive probability of hiring on the equilibrium path. Let such an equilibrium be given. Without loss of generality, let period zero be the first period at which the mechanic is hired with positive probability. The following lemma establishes that if the mechanic is hired at some full history in equilibrium, she must be hired again sufficiently soon (or else the temptation to do a tune-up will be too great). Lemma B.3. Suppose the mechanic is hired at some full history h ∈ H t on the equilibrium path at period t with positive probability, such that • t = 0, or • the mechanic is hired with probability greater than λ t(t+1)/2 . Suppose the mechanic chooses e at h, and let t > t be the earliest future period at which the mechanic is again hired with probability greater than λ t (t +1)/2 . Define K(δ, u, w) ≡ ln(δ − (1 − δ)(1 + w/u))/ ln δ. Then t ≤ t + K(δ, u, w) for λ close enough to one. engine replacements and no tune-ups. This also implies that at each of these hirings, the mechanic must have performed a tune-up with at least probability β * (see (3.2) ). Yet this implies that the posterior of the motorist receiving the (L + 1)th engine replacement at period t L+1 if he observes the full history must have been at least Υ L (µ 0 ) > p * . Thus, hiring was not a best response for that motorist with at least probability λ t L+1 (t L+1 +1)/2 , a contradiction. Note the following useful properties about the function f . Fact B.1. f (t, n; λ) is strictly decreasing in t, and strictly increasing in λ.
Fact B.2. Let any ε > 0 be given. For any t ∈ {0, 1, ...}, n ∈ {2, 3, ...}, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any λ ∈ (λ , 1), f (t, n; λ) > n − 1 − ε.
Let n * be an integer strictly greater than 1 + w/u. Pick λ * ∈ (0, 1) such that f (Ln * , n * + 1; λ * ) ≥ 1 + w/u. (B.9)
Let λ ∈ (λ * , 1) be given. Suppose by contradiction that for any δ * ∈ (0, 1), there always exists δ ∈ (δ * , 1) such that there exists a sequential equilibrium with strategies ρ, σ where the mechanic is hired with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Without loss of generality, let the first such period be 0.
Letσ be the strategy identical to σ except that at any full history containing a tune-up, the mechanic does the right repair with certainty (it may be that σ =σ). Lemma B.2, reproduced here as Lemma B.4 for convenience, shows that deviating toσ is a best response at any full history (the only histories at whichσ may differ from σ are those with tune-ups, and for those histories doing the right repair is always a best response).
Lemma B.4. Let a sequential equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1 and Criterion 1 be given. At any full history h ∈ H containing a tune-up, it is a best response for the mechanic to perform the correct repair.
I use a technique here similar to the proof of Corollary B.1 to simplify calculation of continuation payoffs. Forσ, calculation of the expected stage payoffs following a tune-up is simple (due to Lemma B.4, it is the probability of being hired times u) and due to Criterion 1, they can be used as upper bounds on the expected stage payoffs following an engine replacement (shown below).
For the remainder of the proof, suppose that the mechanic deviates toσ; since by Lemma B.4 such a deviation is a best response at any full history, the continuation payoffs are identical at all histories. At any full history h ∈ H t , let π k a (h) be the probability that the mechanic is hired at period k > t conditional on doing repair a ∈ {c, e} at h, and letν k a (h) denote the expected stage payoff at period k conditional on a. Criterion 1 requires that π k c (h) ≥ π k e (h). Since the mechanic performs all correct repairs following a tune-up,ν k c (h) = π k c (h)u ≥ π k e (h)u ≥ν k e (h).
Lemma B.5. Let the assumptions of Proposition 4.3 and λ ∈ (λ * , 1) be given. For δ close enough to one, if there exists a sequential equilibrium where the mechanic is hired with positive probability at period 0, then there exists a full history ht ∈ Ht on the equilibrium path at some periodt ≤ Ln * where the mechanic is hired with probability greater than 1 − λt (t+1)/2 and ht contains L engine replacements and no tune-ups such that the posterior after observing the full history is µ(ht) ≥ Υ L (µ 0 ).
Proof. The proof is by induction. Let t 1 > 0 be the first period after 0 at which the mechanic is hired with greater than probability 1 − λ t 1 (t 1 +1)/2 , conditional on the mechanic doing an engine replacement in period 0.
I now show that t 1 ≤ n * for δ close enough to one. The continuation payoff of a tune-up at 0 has a lower bound due to Assumption 1 given by
where h 0 is the empty history at period 0. Since the mechanic is hired, the incentive constraint for any n ≤ t 1 . Suppose by contradiction that t 1 > n * . After some rearrangement of (B.10), picking n = n * + 1 gives
Dividing by u and taking the limit of δ gives lim δ→1 n * k=1 δ k [λ k − (1 − λ k(k+1)/2 )] = f (0, n * + 1) < 1 + w/u, so (B.11) contradicts (B.9) for λ > λ * and δ close enough to one. Thus, the mechanic must be hired at period t 1 with probability greater than 1 − λ t 1 (t 1 +1)/2 and t 1 ≤ n * at a full history h t 1 ∈ H t 1 with one engine replacement and no tune-ups. Now for some j ≥ 1, let h t j be a full history at t j ≤ jn * on the equilibrium path where the mechanic is hired with probability greater than 1 − λ t j (t j +1)/2 , such that h t j has j engine
